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Code Constructions for Physical Unclonable
Functions and Biometric Secrecy Systems
Onur Gu¨nlu¨, Onurcan I˙s¸can, Vladimir Sidorenko, Member, IEEE, and Gerhard Kramer, Fellow, IEEE
Abstract—The two-terminal key agreement problem with bio-
metric or physical identifiers is considered. Two linear code
constructions based on Wyner-Ziv coding are developed. The
first construction uses random linear codes and achieves all
points of the key-leakage-storage regions of the generated-secret
and chosen-secret models. The second construction uses nested
polar codes for vector quantization during enrollment and for
error correction during reconstruction. Simulations show that the
nested polar codes achieve privacy-leakage and storage rates that
improve on existing code designs. One proposed code achieves a
rate tuple that cannot be achieved by existing methods.
Index Terms—Information theoretic security, key agreement,
physical unclonable functions, Wyner-Ziv coding.
I. INTRODUCTION
B IOMETRIC features like fingerprints can be used toauthenticate and identify individuals, and to generate
secret keys. Similarly, one can generate secret keys with
physical unclonable functions (PUFs) that are used as sources
of randomness. For example, fine variations of ring oscillator
(RO) outputs and the start-up behavior of static random access
memories (SRAM) can serve as PUFs [2]. Fingerprints and
PUFs are identifiers with high entropy and reliable outputs
[3], [4], and one can consider them as physical “one-way
functions” that are easy to compute and difficult to invert [5].
There are several requirements that a PUF-based key agree-
ment method should fulfill. First, the method should not
leak information about the secret key (no secrecy leakage).
Second, the method should leak little information about the
identifier (limited privacy leakage). For example, in some
applications the same identifier is enrolled multiple times.
If the eavesdropper can extract more information about the
identifier each time it is enrolled, then the eavesdropper might
be able to learn the secret key of some enrollments. Third, one
should limit the storage rate because storage can be expensive
and limited, e.g., for internet-of-things (IoT) devices.
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A. Related Work and on Basic PUF Models
There are two common models for key agreement: the
generated-secret (GS) and the chosen-secret (CS) models. For
the GS model, an encoder extracts a secret key from an
identifier measurement, while for the CS model a secret key
that is independent of the identifier measurements is given to
the encoder by a trusted entity. For the key-agreement model
introduced in [6] and [7], two terminals observe dependent
random variables and have access to an authenticated, public,
one-way communication link; an eavesdropper observes the
public messages, called helper data. The GS model is treated
in [8, Thm. 2.6] as a special case of a more general key
agreement problem with eavesdropper side information and a
helper. However, [6]–[8] do not consider the privacy leakage.
The regions of achievable secret-key vs. privacy-leakage (key-
leakage) rates for the GS and CS models are given in [3], [9].
The storage rates for general (non-negligible) secrecy-leakage
levels are analyzed in [10], while the rate regions with multiple
encoder and decoder measurements of a hidden source are
treated in [11].
The above papers consider identifier measurements that are
independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) according to a
probability distribution with a discrete alphabet. We remark
that raw identifier outputs usually have memory but there are
transform coding algorithms [12, pp. 76], [13] that can extract
almost i.i.d. and uniformly distributed bits from identifier
outputs.
B. Other Models
There are many other key-agreement models. For instance,
key agreement and device authentication with an eavesdropper
that has access to a sequence correlated with the identifier
outputs has been studied in [8], [14]–[16]. This model with
eavesdropper side information may be unrealistic for the
applications we consider because many physical and biometric
identifiers are used for on-demand key reconstruction. This
means that the attack should be performed during execution,
and an invasive attack applied to obtain a correlated sequence
permanently changes the identifier output [4].
A closely related problem to the key agreement problem is
Wyner’s wiretap channel [17], for which code constructions
are studied in, e.g., [18]–[20]. The main aim in this problem
is to hide a transmitted message from the eavesdropper that
observes a channel output correlated with the observation of
a legitimate receiver.
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C. Summary of Contributions
We propose code constructions for the key agreement mod-
els of [3], [9], [11] and illustrate that they are asymptotically
optimal and improve on all existing methods. The code
constructions are based on Wyner-Ziv (WZ) coding [21]. A
summary of the main contributions is as follows.
• We describe two WZ-coding constructions for bi-
nary symmetric sources and binary symmetric channels
(BSCs). Such models are often used for physical identi-
fiers such as RO PUFs [13] and SRAM PUFs [22]. The
first construction is based on [23] and achieves all points
of the key-leakage-storage regions of the GS and CS
models. The novelty is that we propose additional steps
to specify a secret key and show that the construction is
optimal.
• The second construction uses nested polar codes. We de-
sign and simulate our polar codes for standard parameters
for SRAM PUFs under ideal environmental conditions,
and for RO PUFS under varying environmental condi-
tions. The target block-error probability is PB = 10
−6
and the target secret-key size is 128 bits. One of the
codes achieves key-leakage-storage rates that cannot be
achieved by existing methods.
• In Appendix A, we consider strong secrecy.
• In Appendix B, we consider a hidden identifier source
whose noisy measurements via BSCs are observed at
the encoder and decoder. The WZ-coding construction
is shown to be optimal also for such identifiers.
D. Organization
This paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we describe
the GS and CS models, the WZ problem, and give their
rate regions. We show that existing methods are suboptimal
even after applying improvements described in Section III.
Section IV describes a random linear code construction based
on WZ-coding. Section V describes a nested polar code design
for the GS model and illustrates that it improves on existing
code designs.
E. Notation
Upper case letters represent random variables and lower
case letters their realizations. A superscript denotes a string of
variables, e.g.,Xn=X1 . . .Xi . . .Xn, and a subscript denotes
the position of a variable in a string. A random variable X
has probability distribution PX . Calligraphic letters such as
X denote sets, and set sizes are written as |X |. Bold letters
such as H represent matrices. Enc(·) is an encoder mapping
and Dec(·) is a decoder mapping. Hb(x) = −x log x − (1 −
x) log(1 − x) is the binary entropy function, where we take
logarithms to the base 2. The ∗-operator is defined as p ∗ x =
p(1− x) + (1 − p)x. The operator ⊕ represents the element-
wise modulo-2 summation. A BSC with crossover probability
p is denoted by BSC(p). Xn ∼ Bernn(α) is an i.i.d. binary
sequence of random variables with Pr[Xi = 1] = α for
i = 1, 2, . . . , n. HT represents the transpose of H. A linear
error-correction code with parameters (n, k) has block length
n and dimension k.
PX
(S,W )
(a)
= Enc(Xn)
W ′
(b)
= Enc(Xn, S′)
PY |X
Ŝ
(a)
= Dec (Y n,W )
Ŝ′
(b)
= Dec (Y n,W ′)
(a)W
(b)W ′
Xn Y n
Enrollment Reconstruction
S S′ Ŝ Ŝ′
(a) (b)(a) (b)
Fig. 1. The (a) GS and (b) CS models.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATIONS
A. Generated-secret and Chosen-secret Models
Consider the GS model in Fig. 1(a), where a secret key
is generated from a biometric or physical source. The source,
measurement, secret key, and storage alphabets X , Y , S, and
W are finite sets. During enrollment, the encoder observes
an i.i.d. sequence Xn, generated by the identifier (source)
according to some PX , and computes a secret key S and public
helper data W as (S,W )=Enc(Xn). During reconstruction,
the decoder observes a noisy source measurement Y n of
Xn through a memoryless channel PY |X together with the
helper data W . The decoder estimates the secret key as
Ŝ=Dec(Y n,W ). Similarly, Fig. 1(b) shows the CS model,
where a secret key S′ ∈ S that is independent of (Xn, Y n)
is embedded into the helper data as W ′ = Enc(Xn, S′).
The decoder for the CS model estimates the secret key as
Ŝ′ = Dec(Y n,W ′).
Definition 1. A key-leakage-storage tuple (Rs, Rℓ, Rw) is
achievable for the GS model if, given any ǫ > 0, there is
some n≥1, an encoder, and a decoder such that Rs =
log |S|
n
and
Pr[Ŝ 6= S] ≤ ǫ (reliability) (1)
1
n
I(S;W ) ≤ ǫ (weak secrecy) (2)
1
n
H(S) ≥ Rs − ǫ (key uniformity) (3)
1
n
log
∣∣W∣∣ ≤ Rw + ǫ (storage) (4)
1
n
I(Xn;W ) ≤ Rℓ + ǫ (privacy). (5)
Similarly, a tuple (Rs, Rℓ, Rw) is achievable for the CS model
if, given any ǫ > 0, there is some n≥ 1, an encoder, and a
decoder such that Rs =
log |S|
n
and (1)-(5) are satisfied when
S and W are replaced by, respectively, S′ and W ′.
The key-leakage-storage regions Rgs and Rcs for the GS
and CS models, respectively, are the closures of the sets of
achievable tuples for the corresponding models. ♦
Theorem 1 ([3]). The key-leakage-storage regions for the GS
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PXY X̂n = Dec(Y n,W )
W = Enc(Xn)
Xn W
Y n
X̂n
Fig. 2. The WZ problem.
and CS models, respectively, are
Rgs=
⋃
PU|X
{
(Rs, Rℓ, Rw) :
0 ≤ Rs ≤ I(U ;Y ),
Rℓ ≥ I(U ;X)− I(U ;Y ),
Rw ≥ I(U ;X)− I(U ;Y )
}
, (6)
Rcs=
⋃
PU|X
{
(Rs, Rℓ, Rw) :
0 ≤ Rs ≤ I(U ;Y ),
Rℓ ≥ I(U ;X)− I(U ;Y ),
Rw ≥ I(U ;X)
}
(7)
where U −X − Y forms a Markov chain. These regions are
convex sets. The alphabet U of the auxiliary random variable
U can be limited to have size |U|≤|X |+ 1.
For example, suppose Xn ∼ Bernn(12 ) and the channel
PY |X is a BSC(pA), where pA ∈ [0, 0.5]. The key-leakage-
storage region of the GS model for this case is [3]
Rgs,bin=
⋃
q∈[0,0.5]
{
(Rs, Rℓ, Rw) :
0 ≤ Rs ≤ 1−Hb(q ∗ pA),
Rℓ ≥ Hb(q ∗ pA)−Hb(q),
Rw ≥ Hb(q ∗ pA)−Hb(q)
}
. (8)
B. Wyner-Ziv Problem
Consider two dependent random variables X and Y with
joint distribution PXY . Fig. 2 depicts the WZ problem. The
source, side information, and message alphabets X , Y , and
W are finite sets. An encoder that observes Xn generates the
message W . The decoder observes Y n and W and puts out
a quantized version X̂n of Xn. Define the average distortion
between Xn and the reconstructed sequence X̂n as
1
n
n∑
i=1
E[d(Xi, X̂i(Y
n,W ))] (9)
where d(x, xˆ) is a bounded distortion function and X̂i(y
n, w)
is a reconstruction function.
Definition 2. A rate-distortion pair (Rw, D) is achievable if,
given any ǫ > 0, there is some n ≥ 1, an encoder, and a
decoder that satisfy (4) and
1
n
n∑
i=1
E[d(Xi, X̂i(Y
n,W ))] ≤ D + ǫ. (10)
The WZ rate-distortion region RWZ is the closure of the set of
achievable rate-distortion pairs. ♦
Theorem 2 ([21]). The WZ rate-distortion region is
RWZ=
⋃
PU|X
⋃
X̂(Y,U)
{
(Rw, D) :
Rw ≥ I(U ;X)− I(U ;Y ),
D ≥ E[d(X, X̂(Y, U))]
}
(11)
where U −X − Y forms a Markov chain and X̂(Y, U) is a
reconstruction function. One can limit the alphabet U of the
auxiliary random variable U to have size |U|≤ |X |+ 1. The
region RWZ is convex.
III. PRIOR ART AND COMPARISONS
There are several existing code constructions proposed for
the GS and CS models. We consider the three best methods:
the fuzzy-commitment scheme (FCS) [24] for the CS model,
the code-offset fuzzy extractor (COFE) [25], and the polar
code construction in [26] for the GS model. We show that
these constructions are suboptimal in terms of the privacy-
leakage and storage rates.
The binary Golay code is used in [3] as a vector quantizer
(VQ) in combination with Slepian-Wolf (SW) codes [27]
to illustrate that the key vs. storage (or key vs. leakage)
rate ratio can be increased via quantization. This observation
motivates using a VQ to improve the performance of previous
constructions. In Sections IV and V, we apply VQ by using
WZ coding to decrease storage rates, as suggested in [28,
Remark 4.5].
During enrollment with the FCS, an encoder takes a
uniformly distributed secret key S′ as input to generate a
codeword Cn. The codeword and the binary source output
Xn are summed modulo-2, and the sum is stored as helper
dataW ′. During reconstruction,W ′ and a binary sequence Y n
are summed modulo-2 and this sum is used by a decoder to
estimate S′. Similar steps are applied in the COFE, except that
the secret key is a hashed version of Xn. The FCS achieves
one optimal point in the key-leakage region, namely the point
with the maximum secret-key rate R∗s = I(X ;Y ) and the
privacy-leakage rate R∗ℓ = H(X |Y ) [29]. Similarly, the COFE
achieves the same boundary point in the key-leakage region.
This is, however, the only boundary point that these methods
can achieve.
We can improve both methods by adding a VQ step:
instead of Xn we use its quantized version Xnq during
enrollment. This asymptotically corresponds to summing the
original helper data and an independent random variable
Jn ∼ Bernn(q) such that W ′′ = Xn ⊕ Cn ⊕ Jn is the new
helper data so that we create a virtual channel PY |X⊕J and
apply the FCS or COFE to this virtual channel. The modified
FCS and COFE can achieve all points of the key-leakage
region if we take a union of all rate pairs achieved over all
q ∈ [0, 0.5]. However, the helper data has a length of n bits for
both methods, and the resulting storage rate of 1 bit/symbol
is not necessarily optimal.
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The polar code construction in [26] requires less storage rate
than the FCS and COFE. However, this approach improves
only the storage rate and cannot achieve all points of the
key-leakage-storage region. Furthermore, in [26] some code
designs assume that there is a “private” key shared only
between the encoder and decoder, which is not realistic since
a private key requires hardware protection against invasive
attacks. If such a protection is possible, then there is no need
to use an on-demand key reconstruction method like a PUF.
The existing methods cannot, therefore, achieve all points
of the key-leakage-storage region for a BSC, unlike the WZ-
coding constructions we describe in Sections IV and V. There
is another code construction in [30] that is optimal for the GS
and CS models. However, its hardware complexity seems to be
high and it has unrealistic requirements similar to the private
key required for some code designs in [26]; see Remark 6
below.
In previous works such as [31], only the secret-key rates
of the proposed codes are compared because the sum of the
secret-key and storage (or privacy-leakage) rates is fixed. This
constraint means that increasing the key vs. storage (or key
vs. leakage) rate ratio is equivalent to increasing the key rate.
Instead, our code constructions are more flexible in terms of
achievable rate tuples. We will use the key vs. storage rate
ratio as a metric to control the storage and privacy leakage in
our code designs.
IV. FIRST WZ-CODING CONSTRUCTION
Consider the lossy source coding construction proposed in
[23, Section IV] that achieves the boundary points of the
WZ rate-distortion region by using linear codes. We use this
construction to achieve the boundary points of Rgs and Rcs
for a binary uniform identifier source PX and a BSC PY |X
with crossover probability pA.
A. Review of a WZ-coding Construction
Consider the WZ problem depicted in Fig. 2.
Code Construction: Choose uniformly at random the full-
rank parity-check matrices H1, H2, and H as
H =
[
H1
H2
]
(12)
whereH1 with dimensionsm1×n defines a binary (n, n−m1)
linear code C1 and H2 with dimensionsm2×n defines another
binary (n, n−m2) linear code C2. The (n, n−m1−m2) code
C defined by H in (12) is thus a subcode of C1 such that
C1 is partitioned into 2
m2 cosets of C. For some distortion
q ∈ [0, 0.5] and δ > 0, impose the conditions
m1
n
= Hb(q)− δ (13)
m1 +m2
n
= Hb(q ∗ pA) + δ. (14)
Encoding: A VQ quantizes the source output Xn to the
closest codeword Xnq in C1 in Hamming metric. If there are
two or more codewords with the minimum Hamming distance,
the VQ chooses one of them. Define the error sequence
Enq = X
n ⊕Xnq (15)
which resembles an i.i.d. sequence ∼ Bernn(q) when n→∞
due to uniformity of Xn and the linearity of C1 [23].
We publicly store the message
W = Xnq H
T
2 (16)
which corresponds to a coset of C.
Decoding: The decoder sees Y n = Xn ⊕ Zn, where Zn is
independent of Xn and Zn ∼ Bernn(pA). The error sequence
Enq and the noise sequence Z
n are independent. Furthermore,
Enq asymptotically resembles an i.i.d. sequence ∼ Bern
n(q)
when n →∞, as discussed above. Therefore, when n →∞,
the sequence Enq ⊕ Z
n, which corresponds to the noise
sequence of the equivalent channel PY n|Xnq , is distributed
according to Bernn(q ∗ pA) since the equivalent channel is
a concatenation of two BSCs. One can thus reconstruct Xnq
with high probability when n → ∞ by using the syndrome
decoder fC(·) of the code C as follows
X̂nq = Y
n ⊕ fC([0, W ]⊕ Y
n
H
T )
(a)
= Y n ⊕ fC(X
n
q H
T ⊕ Y nHT )
(b)
= (Xnq ⊕ E
n
q ⊕ Z
n)⊕ fC((E
n
q ⊕ Z
n)HT )
(c)
= (Xnq ⊕ E
n
q ⊕ Z
n)⊕ (Enq ⊕ Z
n)
= Xnq (17)
where (a) follows by (16) and because Xnq is a codeword of
C1, (b) follows by (15), and (c) follows with high probability
because, asymptotically, Enq ⊕ Z
n ∼ Bernn(q ∗ pA) so that
the syndrome decoder fC(·) determines the noise sequence
Enq ⊕Z
n. This is because the constraint in (14) indicates that
the code rate of C is below the capacity of the BSC(q ∗ pA).
B. Key Agreement
We propose additional steps to agree on a secret key with
a negligible secrecy-leakage rate. Figs. 3(a) and 3(b) plot the
proposed code construction, respectively, for the GS and CS
models.
Enrollment: After obtaining the helper data W as in (16),
we sum modulo-2 the bit sequence that is in the coset W and
that has the minimum Hamming weight with Xnq to obtain a
codeword Xnc of C. Then, we assign the information sequence
that is encoded to the codeword Xnc as the secret key S
such that Xnc = SG, where G is the generator matrix of
C. The secret key has length n −m1 −m2 bits. We denote
this operation as DecC(·).
Consider the secrecy-leakage rate for the GS model:
lim
n→∞
1
n
I(S;W )= lim
n→∞
1
n
(
H(S)+H(W )−H(W,S)
)
(a)
≤ lim
n→∞
1
n
(
log |S|+ log |W| −H(W,S,Xnq )
)
≤ lim
n→∞
1
n
(
(n−m1 −m2) +m2 −H(X
n
q )
)
(b)
≤ lim
n→∞
1
n
(
n−m1 − (n−m1 − nδn)
)
= 0 (18)
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PX
Xnq = VQ (H1, X
n)
W = Xnq H
T
2 , S=DecC(X
n
q )
W ′
(b)
= [W, S ⊕ S′]
PY |X
X̂nq = Y
n ⊕ fC([0, W ]⊕ Y
n
H
T )
Ŝ=DecC(X̂
n
q )
Ŝ′
(b)
= Ŝ ⊕ (S ⊕ S′)
(a)W
(b)W ′
Xn Y n
Enrollment Reconstruction
S S′ Ŝ Ŝ′
(a) (b)(a) (b)
Fig. 3. First WZ-coding construction for the (a) GS and (b) CS models,
where VQ represents the vector quantization and DecC represents the demap-
ping operation between a codeword of the code C and the corresponding
information sequence.
where (a) follows because (W,S) determines Xnq and
(b) follows with high probability for some δn such that
limn→∞ δn = 0 due to the translation invariance of the linear
code C1 and the uniformity of X
n (see also the discussions in
[32, Section I]).
For the CS model shown in Fig. 3(b), we have access to
an embedded (chosen) secret key S′ that is independent of
(Xn, Y n) and such that S = S ′. We store the helper data
W ′ = [W, S⊕S′]. The secrecy-leakage rate for the CS model
is
lim
n→∞
1
n
I(S′;W ′) = lim
n→∞
1
n
I(S′;W,S ⊕ S′)
(a)
= lim
n→∞
1
n
(
H(S′) +H(W,S ⊕ S′)−H(W,S)−H(S′)
)
≤ lim
n→∞
1
n
(
H(W ) +H(S ⊕ S′)−H(W,S)
)
(b)
≤ lim
n→∞
1
n
(
log |W|+ log |S| −H(W,S,Xnq )
)
(c)
≤ lim
n→∞
1
n
(
m2 + (n−m1−m2)− (n−m1−nδn)
)
=0 (19)
where (a) follows because S′ is independent of (W,S), (b)
follows because S = S ′ and (W,S) determines Xnq , and
(c) follows with high probability for some δn such that
limn→∞ δn = 0 due to the translation invariance of the linear
code C1 and uniformity of X
n.
Reconstruction: After obtaining X̂nq as in (17), the secret-
key is reconstructed in the GS model as
Ŝ = DecC(X̂
n
q ) (20)
and in the CS model as
Ŝ′ = Ŝ ⊕ (S ⊕ S′) (21)
both of which result in the same error probability.
Remark 1. We can improve the weak secrecy in (18) and (19)
to strong secrecy, i.e., we can replace (2) with
I(S;W ) ≤ ǫ (strong secrecy) (22)
by applying information reconciliation and privacy amplifica-
tion steps to multiple blocks of identifier outputs as described
in [33], e.g., by using multiple PUFs in a device for key
agreement.
Remark 2. We argue in Appendix A that there are code con-
structions that provide strong secrecy for general probability
distributions PXY without additional information reconcilia-
tion and privacy amplification steps.
C. Optimality of the Proposed Construction
We prove that the above WZ-coding construction in com-
bination with the proposed key agreement steps is optimal for
the GS model.
Theorem 3. The key-leakage-storage region Rgs,bin in (8) for
the GS model is achieved by using the WZ-coding construction
proposed above.
Proof: By (13) and (14), we have
log |W|
n
=
m2
n
=Hb(q ∗ pA)−Hb(q) + 2δ (23)
so we set Rw = Hb(q ∗ pA)−Hb(q). The secret key satisfies
H(S)
n
≥
n−m1 −m2
n
− δ = 1−Hb(q ∗ pA)− 2δ (24)
so we set RS = 1−Hb(q ∗ pA). Furthermore, we have
I(Xn;W )
n
(a)
=
H(W )
n
≤
log |W|
n
=
m2
n
= Hb(q ∗ pA)−Hb(q) + 2δ. (25)
We thus set Rℓ = Hb(q ∗ pA) − Hb(q), where (a) follows
because Xn determines W .
Combining Theorem 3 with the one-time padding idea
discussed in Section IV-B, we can show the optimality of the
proposed code construction for the CS model also.
Remark 3. We show in Appendix B that the above WZ-
coding construction is optimal also for hidden sources, i.e.,
the encoder observes a noisy measurement of the source rather
than the source itself.
V. SECOND WZ-CODING CONSTRUCTION WITH POLAR
CODES
Polar codes [34] have a low encoding/decoding complexity,
asymptotic optimality for various problems, and good finite
length performance if a list decoder is used. Furthermore, they
have a structure that allows simple nested code design and they
can be used for WZ-coding [35].
Polar codes rely on the channel polarization phenomenon,
where a channel is converted into polarized bit channels by
a polar transform. This transform converts an input sequence
Un with frozen and unfrozen bits to a codeword of the same
length n. A polar decoder processes a noisy observation of the
codeword together with the frozen bits to estimate Un.
Let C(n,F , G|F|) denote a polar code of length n, where F
is the set of indices of the frozen bits and G|F| is the sequence
of frozen bits. In the following, we use the nested polar code
construction proposed in [35].
6 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INFORMATION FORENSICS AND SECURITY
PX X
n PY |X
Y n
Polar
Decoder C1
Un
Helper Data
and Key
Extraction
S
W
Polar
Decoder C
Uˆn
Key
Extraction
Sˆ
V W V
Polar
Transform
BSC(q ∗ pA)
Xnq
Enrollment Reconstruction
Fig. 4. Second WZ-coding construction for the GS model.
A. Polar Code Construction for the GS Model
We use two polar codes C1(n,F1, V ) and C(n,F , V ) with
F = F1∪Fw and V = [V,W ], where V has lengthm1 andW
has length m2 such that m1 and m2 satisfy (13) and (14). The
indices in F1 represent frozen channels with assigned values
V for both codes and C has additional frozen channels with
assigned values W denoted by Fw, i.e., the codes are nested.
The code C1 serves as a VQ with a desired distortion q, and
the code C serves as the error correcting code for a BSC(q ∗
pA). The idea is to obtain W during enrollment and store it
as public helper data. For reconstruction, W is used by the
decoder to estimate the secret key S of length n−m1 −m2.
Fig. 4 shows the block diagram of the proposed construction.
In the following, suppose V is the all-zero vector so that no
additional storage is necessary. This choice has no effect on the
average distortion E[q] between Xn and Xnq defined below;
see [35, Lemma 10].
Enrollment: The uniform binary sequence Xn generated by
a PUF during enrollment is treated as the noisy observation
of a BSC(q). Xn is quantized by a polar decoder of C1. We
extract from the decoder output Un the bits at indices Fw and
store them as the helper data W . The bits at the indices i ∈
{1, 2, . . . , n}\F are used as the secret key. Note that applying
a polar transform to Un generates Xnq , which is a distorted
version of Xn. The distortion betweenXn andXnq is modeled
as a BSC(q) because the error sequence Enq = X
n ⊕ Xnq
resembles an i.i.d. sequence ∼ Bernn(q) when n → ∞ [35,
Lemma 11].
Reconstruction: During reconstruction, the polar decoder
of C observes the binary sequence Y n, which is a noisy
measurement of Xn through a BSC(pA). The frozen bits
V = [V,W ] at indices F are input to the polar decoder.
The output Ûn of the polar decoder is the estimate of Un
and contains the estimate Ŝ of the secret key at the unfrozen
indices of C, i.e., i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} \ F .
We next give a method to design practical nested polar codes
for the GS model.
Construction of C and C1: Since C ⊆ C1 are nested codes,
they must be constructed jointly. F and F1 should be selected
such that the reliability and security constraints are satisfied.
For a given secret key size n − m1 − m2, block length n,
crossover probability pA, and target block-error probability
PB = Pr[S 6= Ŝ], we propose the following procedure.
1) Construct a polar code of rate (n−m1−m2)/n and use
it as the code C, i.e., define the set of frozen indices F .
2) Evaluate the error correction performance of C with a de-
coder for a BSC with a range of crossover probabilities
to obtain the crossover probability pc, resulting in a tar-
get block-error probability of PB . Using pc = E[q]∗pA,
we obtain the target distortion E[q] averaged over a large
number of realizations of Xn.
3) Find an F1 ⊂ F that results in an average distortion of
E[q] with a minimum possible amount of helper data.
Use F1 as the frozen set of C1.
Step 1 is a conventional polar code design task and step 2 is
applied by Monte-Carlo simulations. For step 3, we start with
F
′
1 = F and compute the resulting average distortion E[q
′]
via Monte-Carlo simulations. If E[q′] is not less than E[q],
we remove elements from F
′
1 according to the reliabilities of
the polarized bit channels and repeat the procedure until we
obtain the desired average distortion E[q].
We remark that the distortion level introduced by the VQ
is an additional degree of freedom in choosing the code
design parameters. For instance, different values of PB can
be targeted with the same code by changing the distortion
level. Alternatively, devices with different pA values can be
supported by using the same code. This additional degree of
freedom makes the proposed code design suitable for a wide
range of applications.
B. Proposed Codes for the GS Model
Consider, for instance, the GS model where S is used in
the advanced encryption standard (AES) with length 128, i.e.,
log |S| = n−m1−m2 = 128 bits. If we use PUFs in a field-
programmable gate array (FPGA) as the randomness source,
we must satisfy a block-error probability PB of at most 10
−6
[36]. Consider a BSC PY |X with crossover probability pA =
0.15, which is a common value for SRAM PUFs under ideal
environmental conditions [22] and for RO PUFs under varying
environmental conditions [2]. We design nested polar codes for
these parameters to illustrate that we can achieve better key-
leakage-storage rate tuples than previously proposed codes.
Code 1: Consider n = 1024 and recall that n − m1 −
m2 = 128, PB = 10
−6, and pA = 0.15. Polar successive
cancellation list (SCL) decoders with list size 8 are used as
the VQ and channel decoder. We first design the code C of rate
128/1024 and evaluate its performance with the SCL decoder
for a BSC with a range of crossover probabilities, as shown
in Fig. 5. We observe a block-error probability of 10−6 at a
crossover probability of pc = 0.1819. Since pA = 0.15, this
corresponds to an average distortion of E[q] = 0.0456, i.e.,
E[q] ∗ pA = 0.1819.
Fig. 6 shows the average distortion E[q] with respect to
n − m1 = n − |F1|, obtained by Monte-Carlo simulations.
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Fig. 5. Block-error probability of C over a BSC(pc) with an SCL decoder
(list size 8) for Codes 1 and 2 of length 1024 and 2048, respectively.
We observe from Fig. 6 that the target average distortion is
obtained at n−m1 = 778 bits. Thus, m2 = 650 bits of helper
data suffice to obtain a block-error probability of PB = 10
−6
to reconstruct a n−m1 −m2 = 128-bit secret key.
We observe that the parameter pc is less than pA = 0.15
when we apply the procedure in Section V-A to n = 512 with
the same PB . Therefore, it is not possible to construct a code
with our procedure for n ≤ 512 since q ∗ pA is an increasing
function of q for any q ∈ [0, 0.5]. Such a code construction for
n = 512 might be possible if one improves the code design
and the decoder.
Code 2: Consider the same parameters as in Code 1, except
n = 2048. We apply the same steps as above and plot the
performance of an SCL decoder for a BSC with a range of
crossover probabilities in Fig. 5. A crossover probability of
pc = 0.2682 is required to obtain a block-error probability of
10−6, which gives an average distortion of E[q] = 0.1689.
As depicted in Fig. 6, we achieve the target average distortion
with n−m1 = 739 bits so that helper data of length 611 bits
is required to satisfy PB = 10
−6 for a secret key of length
128 bits.
Remark 4. Our assumptions on the channel statistics are not
necessarily satisfied for the model depicted in Fig. 4 for finite
n since, e.g., the channel PXn|Xnq is not∼ Bern
n(q). However,
our code designs and analysis are based on simulations made
over a large number of possible inputs at fixed lengths, which
allows us to give reliability guarantees to a set of input
realizations. The results of such guarantees are given below.
The error probability PB is calculated as an average over a
large number of PUF realizations, i.e., over a large number of
PUF devices with the same circuit design. To satisfy the block-
error requirement for each PUF realization, one could consider
using the maximum distortion instead of E[q] as a metric in
step 3 in Section V-A. This would increase the amount of
helper data. We can guarantee a block-error probability of at
most 10−6 for 99.99% of all realizations xn of Xn by adding
32 bits to the helper data for Code 1 and 33 bits for Code
2. The numbers of extra helper data bits required are small
since the variance of the distortion q over all PUF realizations
is small for the blocklengths considered. For comparisons, we
use the helper data sizes required to guarantee PB = 10
−6 for
600 700 800 900 1,000
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
(778, 0.0456)
Code 1
(739, 0.1689)
Code 2
n−m1
E
[q
]
Fig. 6. Average distortion E[q] with respect to n−m1 with an SCL decoder
(list size 8) for Codes 1 and 2 of length 1024 and 2048, respectively.
99.99% of all PUF realizations.
C. Code Comparisons and Discussions
We show in Fig. 7 the storage-key (Rw, Rs) projection
of the boundary points of the rate region Rgs,bin in (8) for
pA = 0.15. Furthermore, we show the point with the maximum
secret-key rate R∗s and the minimum storage rate R
∗
w to
achieve R∗s . For the FCS and COFE, we use the random
coding union bound [37, Thm. 16] to confirm that the plotted
rate pairs are achievable for a secret-key length of 128 bits,
a block-error probability of PB = 10
−6, and blocklengths
of n = 1024 and n = 2048. For the same key length and
block-error probability we also plot the best code given in
[22], which is a concatenation of an inner (4, 1) repetition
code and an outer (32, 16) Reed-Muller (RM) code. In [22],
the COFE is used for a block of biased SRAM PUFs. These
rate pairs are shown in Fig. 7 to the right of the dashed line
representing Rw + Rs = 1. Similarly, the rate pairs achieved
by the polar code design in [26] and Codes 1 and 2 are shown
in Fig. 7.
The storage rates of the FCS and COFE are 1 bit/symbol,
which is suboptimal as discussed in Section III. The polar
code construction in [26] achieves a rate point with Rs +
Rw = 1 bit/symbol, which is expected since this is a SW-
coding construction. The polar code construction improves on
the rate pairs achieved by the FCS and COFE in terms of
the key vs. storage ratio. Note that the FCS, COFE, and the
previous polar code construction achieve the privacy-leakage
rate Rℓ = 1−Rs bits/symbol; see [29, Eq. (21)].
We achieve the key-leakage-storage rates of approxi-
mately (0.125, 0.666, 0.666) bits/symbol by Code 1 and
(0.063, 0.315, 0.315) bits/symbol by Code 2, projections of
which are depicted in Fig. 7. These rates are significantly
better than the best rate tuple (0.125, 0.875, 0.875) bits/symbol
in the literature, i.e., the polar code construction in [26], for
the same constraints and without any private key assumption.
We increase the key vs. storage rate ratio Rs/Rw from 0.188
for Code 1 to 0.199 for Code 2, which suggests to increase
the blocklength to obtain better ratios. Furthermore, Code
2 achieves privacy-leakage and storage rates that cannot be
achieved by existing methods without applying time sharing
(see, e.g., [38, Section 4.4]). This is because Code 2 achieves
privacy-leakage and storage rates of 0.315 bits/symbol that
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Fig. 7. Storage-key rates for the GS model with pA = 0.15. The (R
∗
w , R
∗
s) point is the best possible point achieved by SW-coding constructions, which
lies on the dashed line representing Rw +Rs = H(X). The block-error probability satisfies PB ≤ 10
−6 and the key length is 128 bits for all code points.
are significantly less than the minimum privacy-leakage and
storage rates R∗w = R
∗
ℓ = Hb(pA) ≅ 0.610 bits/symbol that
can be asymptotically achieved by existing methods at the
maximum secret-key rate R∗s ≅ 0.390 bits/symbol.
We use the sphere packing bound [39, Eq. (5.8.19)] to upper
bound the key vs. storage rate ratio that can be achieved
by SW-coding constructions for the maximum secret-key rate
point. Consider pA = 0.15, n = 1024, and PB = 10
−6,
for which the sphere packing bound requires that the rate of
the code C satisfies RC ≤ 0.273. If we assume that the key
rate is given by its maximal value Rs = RC and the storage
rate is given by its minimal value Rw = 1 − RC , then we
arrive at Rs/Rw ≤ 0.375. A similar calculation for n = 2048
yields Rs/Rw ≤ 0.437. These results indicate that there are
still gaps between the maximum key vs. storage rate ratios
achieved by WZ-coding constructions, which might achieve
higher ratios than SW-coding constructions, and the ratios
achieved by Codes 1 and 2. The gaps can be reduced by using,
e.g., larger list sizes at the decoder, but this is not desired
for IoT applications that require low hardware complexity.
For other PUF applications, codes that satisfy PB ≤ 10
−9
should be designed [13], for which either laborious decoder
simulations or analytical block-error probability bounds seem
to be required.
VI. CONCLUSION
We argued that a WZ-coding construction based on random
linear codes is asymptotically optimal for the GS and CS mod-
els with uniform binary sources with decoder measurements
through a BSC. These source and channel models are standard
models for RO PUFs and SRAM PUFs. We implemented a
second WZ-coding construction with nested polar codes that
achieve better rate tuples than existing methods, and one of
our codes achieves a rate tuple that cannot be achieved by
existing methods without time sharing. Gaps to the maximum
key vs. storage rate ratios were illustrated.
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APPENDIX A
STRONG SECRECY
Theorem 4. For the GS model (or CS model), given any ǫ > 0,
there exist some n ≥ 1, an encoder, and a decoder that achieve
the key-leakage-storage region Rgs (or Rcs) and that satisfy
the strong-secrecy constraint in (22).
We give proof sketches for Theorem 4 for the GS model by
using two approaches; the first uses output statistics of random
binning (OSRB) [40] and the second uses resolvability [41]
and a likelihood encoder [42]. The proofs for the CS model
follow by applying a one-time pad step, as in Section IV-B.
Proof Sketch 1: We first give a random binning based
proof by following the steps in [40]. Fix a PU|X and let
(Un, Xn, Y n) be i.i.d. according to PU|XPXPY |X . For each
un, assign three random bin indices S ∈ [1 : 2nRs ], W ∈ [1 :
2nRw ], and C ∈ [1 : 2nRc ], which represent, respectively, the
secret key, helper data, and randomness shared by encoder,
decoder, and eavesdropper (similar to W ).
We use a SW decoder to estimate Ûn from (C,W, Y n),
which satisfies (1) if (see [40, Lemma 1])
Rc +Rw > H(U |Y ). (26)
We further have that (S,W,C) are almost mutually inde-
pendent and uniform so that (3) and (22) are satisfied if we
have (see [40, Theorem 1])
Rs +Rw +Rc < H(U). (27)
Similarly, the shared randomness C is almost independent of
Xn, suggesting that it is almost independent of Y n also, if
Rc < H(U |X). (28)
Applying Fourier-Motzkin elimination [43, Section 12.2] to
(26)-(28), we can show that there exists a binning with a fixed
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value of C and it achieves all rate tuples (Rs, Rℓ, Rw) in the
key-leakage-storage region Rgs with strong secrecy.
Proof Sketch 2: We next sketch a random coding based
proof by following the steps in [42] and [44, Section 1.6.2].
Consider the channel coding problem where S ∈ [1 : 2nRs ]
and W ∈ [1 : 2nRw ] are uniform and independent inputs
of an encoder Enc(·) with the output codeword Un that
passes through a channel PX|U to obtain X
n, which further
passes through the channel PY |X to obtain Y
n. Applying the
resolvability result from [41, Theorem 1], one can simulate
Xn ∼
∏n
i=1 PX(xi) if
Rs +Rw > I(U ;X). (29)
Furthermore, one can reliably estimate Ûn from (W,Y n) if
Rs < I(U ;Y ). (30)
Note that this channel coding problem defines a joint proba-
bility distribution
P˜SWXnY n(s, w, x
n, yn)
=QUnifS (s)Q
Unif
W (w)1{x
n=Enc(w, s)}
n∏
i=1
PY |X(yi|xi) (31)
where QUnifS and Q
Unif
W are uniform probability distributions
over the sets, respectively, [1 : 2nRs ] and [1 : 2nRw ], and 1{·}
is the indicator function.
However, for the original problem, we should invert the
random coding and use a stochastic encoder according to
the conditional probability distribution P˜SW |Xn obtained from
(31), which induces a joint distribution
PSWXnY n(s, w, x
n, yn)
= P˜SW |Xn(s, w|x
n)
n∏
i=i
PX(xi)PY |X(yi|xi). (32)
It follows from the above channel coding problem that (1),
(3), (4), and (22) are satisfied. We can show that there exist
some n ≥ 1, an encoder, and a decoder that achieve all
rate tuples (Rs, Rℓ, Rw) in the key-leakage-storage regionRgs
with strong secrecy.
Remark 5. A random linear code (RLC) construction for
binary input channels [45] can provide resolvability for the
bins (S,W ) with strong secrecy. A binary U is optimal for the
rate regions Rgs and Rcs if, e.g., PY |X can be decomposed
into a mixture of BSCs [11, Theorem 3].
Remark 6. In [30, Theorem 10], a polar code construction
based on OSRB is shown to be optimal for the GS model with
strong secrecy. This construction requires chains of identifier
outputs, each of which has size n, and a secret seed shared
between the encoder and decoder. For a finite blocklength, the
secret seed size can be large and it can be seen as a “private”
key, which is not realistic as discussed in Section III for some
code constructions in [26]. Furthermore, the constructions
used in Proofs 1 and 2 of Theorem 4 are stochastic and such
code constructions do not seem to be practical.
APPENDIX B
EXTENSIONS TO HIDDEN SOURCES WITH MULTIPLE
DECODER MEASUREMENTS
The GS and CS models in Fig. 1 are extended in [11] by
having the encoder measure a noisy version X˜n of a hidden, or
remote, identifier sourceXn. The encoder generates or embeds
a secret key and sends a public message W or W ′ to the
decoder. The decoder observes another noisy measurement Y n
of the source and estimates the secret key. The key-leakage-
storage regions that satisfy (1)-(5) for the GS and CS models
with a hidden source are given in the following theorem.
Theorem 5 ([11]). The key-leakage-storage regions for the
GS and CS models with a hidden source, respectively, are
R˜gs=
⋃
P
U|X˜
{
(Rs, Rℓ, Rw) :
0 ≤ Rs ≤ I(U ;Y ),
Rℓ ≥ I(U ;X)− I(U ;Y ),
Rw ≥ I(U ; X˜)− I(U ;Y )
}
, (33)
R˜cs=
⋃
P
U|X˜
{
(Rs, Rℓ, Rw) :
0 ≤ Rs ≤ I(U ;Y ),
Rℓ ≥ I(U ;X)− I(U ;Y ),
Rw ≥ I(U ; X˜)
}
(34)
where U−X˜−X−Y forms a Markov chain. These regions are
convex sets. The alphabet U of the auxiliary random variable
U can be limited to have size |U|≤|X˜ |+ 2.
Suppose next that the encoder measures a binary hidden
source Xn through a channel P
X˜|X such that the inverse
channel P
X|X˜ is a BSC, and the decoder measures the source
through a channel PY |X that is a BSC.
Theorem 6 ([11]). Assume P
X|X˜ is a BSC and PY |X is a
binary-input symmetric memoryless channel. The boundary
points of R˜gs and R˜cs are achieved by channels PX˜|U that
are BSCs.
We next argue the optimality of the first WZ-coding con-
struction given in Section IV for the GS and CS models with
the hidden source model considered above.
Theorem 7. The WZ-coding construction given in Section IV
achieves the regions R˜gs and R˜cs for a uniform source X
n,
an inverse channel P
X|X˜ that is a BSC, and a decoder-
measurement channel PY |X that is also a BSC.
Proof: We modify the WZ-coding construction in Sec-
tion IV by defining the new error sequence
E˜nq = X˜
n ⊕ X˜nq (35)
which resembles an i.i.d. sequence ∼ Bernn(q) for some
q ∈ [0, 0.5] when X˜nq is the closest codeword of C1 to X˜
n in
Hamming distance and when n→∞. The new error sequence
represents the BSC P
X˜|U since the new common randomness
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X˜nq asymptotically represents the auxiliary random variable
Un. Therefore, we asymptotically obtain the memoryless
channel P
X˜|U ∼ BSC(q). It follows from Theorem 6 that
applying the modified code construction and taking a union of
the rate tuples achieved over all q ∈ [0, 0.5], we can achieve
the boundary points of R˜gs and R˜cs.
Remark 7. Applying additional information reconciliation
and privacy amplification steps to multiple identifier blocks,
as in Remark 1, provides strong secrecy also for hidden
sources. Alternatively, random binning and random coding
based approaches can be applied, as in Theorem 4, to show
that there exist code constructions that provide strong secrecy.
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